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In this article Adorno’s approach to Mahler is subjected to linguistic-conceptual critique, in
order to highlight its ambiguous philosophical and methodological syncretizing of discourses of
epistemological commensurability and hermeneutic incommensurability. As a response to this
and to Adorno’s privileging of authorial production as determinant of meaning, this study
invokes Richard Rorty’s pragmatist philosophy and aspects of translation theory in order better
to understand the world of post-Adornian Mahlerian meaning generated by use of the music in
diverse screen works over the last half century. Examples of the ‘re-description’ of Mahler’s
music resulting from such usage are discussed in relation to the tradition spawned by Visconti’s
Death in Venice and in various contexts of appropriation, fragmentation and juxtaposition
through which radical re-conﬁgurations of putative meaning take place.
Life is and: the accidental and the immutable, the elusive and the graspable, the
bizarre and the predictable, the actual and the potential, all the multiplying
realities, entangled, overlapping, colliding, conjoined — plus the multiplying
illusions! y Is an intelligent human being likely to be much more than a large-
scale manufacturer of misunderstanding?1
Vera Micznik has done more than most Mahler scholars in expertly unpicking the
theoretical substructure of discussions of meaning, programmes, and the axis of
poietic and aesthesic levels associated with the composer’s music.2 Yet at the end
of her most recent study, she signs oﬀ by quoting a golden passage from near the
beginning of Adorno’s Mahler book that seems to undercut such theorizing, and
1 Philip Roth, The Counterlife [1986] (London: Vintage, 2005): 310.
2 See ‘Is Mahler’s Music Autobiographical? A Re-appraisal’, Revue Mahler Review
1 (Feb. 1987): 47–63; ‘Meaning in Gustav Mahler’s Music: A Historical and Analytical
Study Focussing on the Ninth Symphony’ (PhD diss., State University of New York at
Stony Brook, 1989); ‘The Farewell Story of Mahler’s Ninth Symphony’, 19th-Century Music
20 (1996–7), 144–66; ‘The Absolute Limitations of Programme Music: the Case of Liszt’s Die
Ideale’, Music & Letters 80 (1999): 207–40; ‘Music and Narrative Revisited: Degrees of
Narrativity in Beethoven and Mahler’, Journal of the Royal Musical Association 126 (2001):
193–249; ‘ ‘‘Ways of Telling’’ in Mahler’s Music: The Third Symphony as Narrative Text’ in
Perspectives on Gustav Mahler, ed., Jeremy Barham (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005): 295–323;
‘Music and Aesthetics: the Programme Issue’ in The Cambridge Companion to Mahler, ed.,
Jeremy Barham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 35–48.
moreover to challenge the ‘plural textualities’ and open-ended ‘semiotic chains’
she had previously been advocating in her text. The quoted section reads:
[Mahler] is particularly resistant to theorizing because he entirely fails to
acknowledge the choice between technique and imaginative content. y To
understand him would be to endow with speech the music’s structural elements
while technically locating the glowing expressive intentions. Mahler can only be
seen in perspective by moving still closer to him, by entering into the music and
confronting the incommensurable presence that deﬁes stylistic categories of
program and absolute musicy Instead of illustrating ideas, [his symphonies] are
destined concretely to become the idea. As each of their moments, tolerating no
evasion into the approximate, fulﬁls its musical function, it becomes more than its
mere existence: a script prescribing its own interpretation.3
Micznik earlier admits that it is ‘importanty toy argue why some programmatic
readings are more plausible than others’.4 And both she and Adorno appear to be
caught in the poststructuralist dilemma between a supposed anti-authoritarian and
anti-authorial critical relativism on the one hand, and on the other, a hierarchical
privileging of certain readings, such that in terms of a quasi-Orwellian doublethink,
‘all interpretations are equal but some are more equal than others’. Immediately
after the above-quoted passage, Adorno continues:
The curves so enjoined are to be traced by contemplation, rather than by
ratiocination on the music from an ostensibly ﬁxed standpoint external to it, in the
pharisaic manner of the ‘New Objectivity’, tirelessly toying with cliche´s such as
that of the titanic late Romantic.5
Furthermore, Micznik’s two ellipses omit, among other things, the following
phrases in Adorno’s text:
In his work a purely musical residue stubbornly persists that can be interpreted in
terms neither of processes nor of moods.6
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1992): 4, cited in Micznik, ‘Music and Aesthetics’, 48. Mahler
aber ist darum gegen das theoretische Wort besonders spro¨de, weil er der Alternative von
Technologie und Vorstellungsgehalt u¨berhaupt nicht gehorcht. y Ihn verstu¨nde, wer die
musikalischen Strukturelemente zum Sprechen bra¨chte, die aufblitzenden Intentionen des
Ausdrucks aber technisch lokalisierte. Mahler ist in Perspektive nur dadurch zu ru¨cken, daß
man noch na¨her an ihn heran, daß man in ihn hineingeht und dem Inkommensurabeln sich
stellt, das der Stilkategorien programmatischer und absoluter Musik ebenso spottety . Anstatt
Ideen zu illustrieren, ist sie [seine Symphonik] konkret zur Idee bestimmt. Indem ein jeglicher
ihrer Augenblicke, ohne Ausweichen ins Ungefa¨hre zu dulden, seine kompositorischen
Funktion genu¨gt, wird er mehr also sein bloßes Dasein; eine Schrift, welche die eigene Deutung
vorschreibt. Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1960): 9–10.
4 ‘Music and Aesthetics’, 47.
5 Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy, 4. Die Kurven solcher No¨tigung sind betrachtend
nachzuzeichnen, anstatt daß u¨ber die Musik von einen ihr a¨ußerlichen, vermeintlich ﬁxen
Standpunkt aus ra¨soniert wu¨rde wie dem neusachlichen Pharisa¨ismus, der unverdrossen
mit Cliche´s wie dem vom titatenhaften Spa¨tromantiker herumwu¨rfelt. Mahler: Eine
musikalische Physiognomik, 10.
6 Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy, 3. Bei ihm behauptet im Reinmusikalischen
hartna¨ckig sich ein Rest, der doch weder auf Vorga¨nge noch auf Stimmungen zu
interpretieren ware. Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik, 10.
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and:
His symphonies assist such closeness by the compelling spirituality of their
sensuous musical conﬁgurations.7
On the one hand, then, Adorno denies access to the interpretation of Mahler’s
music through rational analysis and objectivity in favour of ‘contemplation’, but
on the other hand, he suggests that Mahler’s symphonic content tolerates ‘no
evasion into the approximate’ and provides ‘a script prescribing its own
interpretation’. The key to this paradox would seem to lie ﬁrst in the distinction
Adorno makes between music ‘becoming’ a concrete idea as opposed to merely
‘illustrating’ ideas, and second, by contrast, his blurring of the distinction within
criticism between imagination and inference, the twin philosophical poles of
hermeneutic and epistemological inquiry.8 Just as signiﬁcantly, the sentences
omitted by Micznik intimate the existence of a profound spiritual dimension in
Mahler’s music that emanates from its physical attributes but nevertheless deﬁes
deﬁnition. The reason this approach is paradoxical, or at least confusing, is that,
through his allusion-drenched phraseology, Adorno appears to be invoking
diﬀerent philosophical systems to frame his thinking. What is more, Edmund
Jephcott’s translation, on which Micznik’s article is drawing, tends to exacerbate
this uncertainty through an occasional softening of tone and subtle reinterpreta-
tion of syntax. This is not to ﬁnd fault with Jephcott’s heroic translation, but
rather to highlight the perennial diﬃculties of the act of translation itself – made
no easier in this case by Adorno’s complex and ﬁgurative prose style. These
ambiguities demonstrate how simple vocabulary and context issues are
inextricably linked to deeper and more complex conceptual questions.
For example, in the sentence: ‘Ihn verstu¨nde, wer die musikalischen Strukture-
lemente zum Sprechen bra¨chte, die aufblitzenden Intentionen des Ausdrucks aber
technisch lokalisierte’, ‘aufblitzenden’ has been translated as ‘glowing’, which,
although one of the word’s possible meanings, does not capture the full implication
of its root, ‘Blitz’ (‘lightning’).9 The widely known ﬁgurative meaning of ‘aufblitzen’
is ‘to ﬂash’, ‘to gleam suddenly’, or to ‘glance like lightning’, and this has been most
commonly associated with the notion of thoughts ﬂashing across the mind. This
distinction is not mere pedantry, for it seems that there is likely a strong sense of the
involuntary, the unbidden and the inspirational in what Adorno is saying about
Mahler’s ‘expressive intentions’. Indeed this is precisely how the word is used by
Nietzsche (whose writings constituted one of the formative inﬂuences on Adorno’s
thinking) in his self-reﬂections on the origins and content of Also sprach Zarathustra
found in Ecce Homo. In a discussion of the role of inspiration, Nietzsche writes:
One hears, one does not seek; one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like
lightning, a thought ﬂashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its
7 Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy, 4. Seine Symphonik hilft dazu durch die zwingende
Spiritualita¨t ihrer sinnlich-musikalischen Konﬁgurationen. Mahler: Eine musikalische
Physiognomik, 10.
8 See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980):
315–56.
9 One of the meanings of ‘Aufblitzen’, a literal one, is the same as one of the meanings
of ‘Aufblicken’, which is used in metallurgy to describe the glowing or brightening of a
metal.
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form—I never had any choice. y Everything happens involuntarily, in the highest
degree but as in a gale of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity.10
The dialectical paradox – somewhat concealed in the English – between ‘unfreiwillig’
(implying the determining of something independently of one’s will, possibly by a
‘higher force’) and ‘Freiheitsgefu¨hl’ (suggesting the impression of a personally felt
context of freedom) is precisely that which Adorno expresses in his linguistic
formulation of the (uncontrolled) ‘ﬂashing like lightning’ of the (controlled)
‘expressive intentions’ in Mahler’s music, that are to be ‘technically located’, but only
through ‘contemplation’, on a wave of Nietzschean ‘divine power’, for which wemay
read Adorno’s Mahlerian ‘compelling spirituality’. This dialectic also characterizes
Adorno’s almost biblical counterpoising of the following two oppositional groups of
terms and statements (some oﬀered here with alternative translations):
A. Commensurability and inference
> Mahler’s symphonism ‘destined concretely’ (as opposed to – in philosophical
terms – abstractly) ‘to become the idea’ (or, more literally, to be ‘deﬁned’ or
‘ordained as Idea’ in the sense of ‘the word made ﬂesh’)
> the musical elements not ‘tolerating’ approximation (translatable just as
accurately, but more strongly, as not ‘permitting’)
> each moment of the music becoming ‘more than its mere existence’ (the use
of ‘Dasein’ inevitably evoking a critique of Heideggerian ahistorical, immediate
presence or being)11
> the script’s ‘prescribed’ meaning (more strongly: ‘dictated’ or ‘commanded’)
> the ‘enjoined’ contours of this meaning (more strongly: ‘forced’, ‘compelled’)
> the ‘tracing’ (that is, the precise drawing from a copy) of those contours
> the ‘compelling’ spirituality (more strongly: ‘constraining’, ‘coercive’) of the
music’s ‘sensuous’ (that is, ‘perceptible’) conﬁgurations
B. Incommensurability and imagination
> the ‘incommensurable’ nature of Mahler’s music (that is, the impossibility of
its being measured or compared, in the sense of Hegelian absolute ‘Geist’,
but also seeming to reinstate a Heideggerian notion of unmediated ‘being’)12
10 Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: The
Modern Library, 1968): 756–57. Kaufmann’s translation could itself be re-worked with
respect to the phrase ‘a thought ﬂashes up, with necessity of form, without hesitation’, and
the translation of ‘Unbedingtsein’ as ‘unconditionality’ instead of ‘absoluteness’. Man ho¨rt,
man sucht nicht; man nimmt,—man fragt nicht, wer da gibt; wie ein Blitz leuchtete ein
Gedanke auf, mit Notwendigkeit in der Form, ohne Zo¨gern,—ich habe nie eine Wahl
gehabt.y Alles geschieht im ho¨chsten Grade unfreiwillig, aber wie in einem Sturm von
Freiheitsgefu¨hl, von Unbedingtsein, von Macht, von Go¨ttlichkeit.
11 See Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993): 10, and Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture. Essays on Critical Theory and
Music (London: Kahn & Averill, 1996): 68, for discussion of Adorno’s critique of Heidegger.
12 Jean Paul’s deﬁnition of wit as a form of deep critical understanding distinct from
acumen, likewise involved the discovery of similarities between ‘incommensurable
magnitudes’, and shares terminology and process with Adorno: ‘a natural instinct
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> Mahler’s symphonism as incarnated ‘Idea’, which evokes the vast religio-
philosophical tradition of this indeterminate, irreducible term’s use: from
Plato’s metaphysical essence of things, through the mediaeval Christian
‘Idea’ as the ‘thought of God’, to the Cartesian subjective ‘Idea’ as the mind’s
representation of a thing, Hegel’s ‘Idea’ as objective truth and true being,
and Schopenhauer’s metaphysical division of ‘Will’ and ‘Idea’: ‘Music is as
immediate an objectiﬁcation and copy of the whole will as the world itself
is, indeed as the Ideas are’13; while all the other arts ‘objectify the will
only indirectly, in other words, by means of the Ideas’, music is related to
the Ideas in the sense of being an analogous direct manifestation of the
noumenal in the phenomenal world, ‘by no means y a copy of the Ideas,
but a copy of the will itself’,14 that is, existing as Idea, rather than illustrating
ideas (Schopenhauer and Adorno both shared a disdain for the programme
music aesthetic).
> the privileging of an unsystematic ‘contemplation’ of music over rational
argument and dogmatic, rule-bound ‘Pharisaism’ (a term whose Jewish
connotations would bear further scrutiny)
> the acknowledgment in Mahler’s music of a ‘purely musical’ residue that
‘persists’ (more strongly: ‘makes its inﬂuence (or power) felt’) and that cannot be
interpreted structurally or emotionally, combined with the music’s coercive
‘spirituality’, comes close to aping the sentiments of passages that Hanslick
excised from later editions of his Vom musikalischen Scho¨nen in order to
distance himself from idealist philosophy (the omitted passages are shown
in italics below):
If we now ask what is to be expressed with this tone-material, then the answer is:
musical ideas. A musical idea brought to its appearance is already autonomous
beauty; it is already an end in itself and in no way primarily a medium or material
for the representation of feelings and thoughts, even if it is capable of possessing, at the
same time, a high degree of symbolic signiﬁcance in its reﬂection of the great laws of the
world, which is something we ﬁnd in all artistic beauty. Sounding forms in motion are
the sole and exclusive content and object of music.15
enforces this similarity, and it is therefore more obvious and always instantaneous. The
witty relationship is contemplated; acumen, on the contrary, which discovers and
distinguishes new relationships between the established relationships of commensurable
and similar magnitudes, obliges us to carry through a long series of ideas the lightwhich in
wit ﬂashes by itself from the cloud’, ‘y43. Wit, Acumen and Profundity’, in Vorlesungen u¨ber
Aesthetik (1804, rev. 1813 & 1825), cited in Kathleen Wheeler, ed., German Aesthetic and
Literary Criticism: The Romantic Ironists and Goethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984): 187; all but the ﬁrst set of italics are mine.
13 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J. Payne,
2 vols (New York: Dover Publications, 1966): I: 257.
14 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: I: 257.
15 Eduard Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Scho¨nen: Ein Beitrag zur Revision der A¨sthetik in
der Tonkunst, ed. Dietmar Strauss, 2 vols. (Mainz: Schott, 1990): I: 75, Eng. trans. from Mark
Evan Bonds, ‘Idealism and the Aesthetics of Instrumental Music at the Turn of the
Nineteenth Century’, Journal of the American Musicological Society, 50 (1997): 387–420;
quotation, 415.
Fragt es sich nun, was mit diesem Tonmaterial ausgedru¨ckt werden soll, so lautet die
Antwort: Musicalische Ideen. Eine vollsta¨ndig zur Erscheinung gebrachte musikalische
Idee aber ist bereits selbststa¨ndiges Scho¨ne, ist Selbstzweck und keineswegs erst wieder
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This spiritual content also now unites in the disposition of the listener the beautiful in
music with all other great and beautiful ideas. It is not merely and absolutely through its
own intrinsic beauty that music aﬀects the listener, but rather at the same time as a
sounding image of the great motions of the universe. Through profound and secret
connections to nature, the meaning of tones is elevated high above the tones themselves,
allowing us to perceive at the same time the inﬁnite in works of human talent. Because the
elements of music – sound, tone, rhythm, loudness, softness – are to be found throughout
the entire universe, so does one ﬁnd anew in music the entire universe.16
In view of Adorno’s seemingly conﬂicted conceptual framework and partly
shared vocabulary, we may be justiﬁed in asking to what extent his thinking is
covertly reliant on a nineteenth-century aesthetics which, like that of Hanslick, did
not see idealism and formalism as incompatible, but rather, in a thoroughly
Adornian apparent paradox, ‘allowed instrumental music to retain its autonomy
through an intrinsically musical, self-referential content without thereby being
isolated from ‘‘extramusical’’ ideas’,17 of Geist or the spiritual dimension. This was
because ‘idealism actually gave composers and critics unprecedented liberty to
explicate instrumental works’, not necessarily in a facile programmatic sense but in
terms of music as ‘[a] reﬂection of an abstract ideal [which]y is quite diﬀerent from
the representation of a speciﬁc object or event’.18 With comparatively little diﬃculty,
through subtle shifts in terminological focus mediated by the act of translating a
small excerpt of his text (but to an extent existing in the original German too),
Adorno may be taken as more, or less, neo-idealist, empiricist, structuralist, proto-
postmodernist, formalist, absolutist, intuitive, rigorous, Hegelian, Schopenhauerian
and so on, in approach – and all this even before attending to the sociological aspects
of his theorizing. Such eclectic potential indeed aligns with the multiple inﬂuences
acting on the formation of Adorno’s thought, as examined at length by Max
Paddison.19 Through the agency of language we are beginning to lose a coherent
sense of the ‘writerly’ subject and the ‘readerly’ object, even though language is the
only guarantor of either’s viability. As Georg Luka´cs wrote in 1920:
as the objective world breaks down, so the Subject, too, becomes a fragment; only
the ‘I’ continues to exist, but its existence is then lost in the insubstantiality of its
self-created world of ruins. Such subjectivity wants to give form to everything, and
precisely for this reason succeeds only in mirroring a segment of the world.20
Mittel oder Material zur Darstellung von Gefu¨hlen und Gedanken; wenn sie gleich in hohem
Grad jene symbolische, die großen Weltgesetze wiederspiegelnde Bedeutsamkeit besitzen kann,
welche wir in jedem Kunstscho¨nen vorﬁnden. To¨nend bewegte Formen sind einzig und allein
Inhalt und Gegenstand der Musik.
16 Hanslick, Vom Musikalisch-Scho¨nen, I: 171, Eng. trans. from Bonds, ‘Idealism’,
414–15. Dieser geistige Gehalt verbindet nun auch im Gemu¨th des Ho¨rers das Scho¨ne der
Tonkunst mit allen andern großen und scho¨nen Ideen. Ihm wirkt die Musik nicht blos und absolut
durch ihre eigenste Scho¨nheit, sondern zugleich als to¨nendes Abbild der großen Bewegungen im
Weltall. Durch tiefe und geheime Naturbeziehungen steigert sich die Bedeutung der To¨ne hoch u¨ber
sie selbst hinaus und la¨ßt uns in dem Werke menschlichen Talents immer zugleich das Unendliche
fu¨hlen. Da die Elemente der Musik: Schall, Ton, Rhythmus, Sta¨rke, Schwa¨che im ganzen
Universum sich ﬁnden, so ﬁndet der Mensch wieder in der Musik das ganze Universum.
17 Bonds, ‘Idealism’, 417.
18 Bonds, ‘Idealism’, 416.
19 See Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music.
20 George Luka´cs, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin Press,
1971): 53, quoted in Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music, 32.
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It is not my purpose here to attempt to answer the question posed above, or
to pursue the categorization of Adorno much further.21 What I hope to have
demonstrated, however, is that both Hanslick (through textual excision) and Adorno
(through use of a vocabulary which lends itself to multiple readings and emphases
of translation) open their ideas up to radical forms of conceptual re-contextualization
and interpretative re-description. The extent to which Adorno desires or intends this
for his text is diﬃcult to determine, but what is more certain is that through the
unstable conceptual and perceptual ﬁlter of language, the readerly ‘object’ (Mahler’s
music) also is ‘involuntarily’ and in a ‘felt context of freedom’ opened up for
re-contextualization and re-description. Depending on one’s reading of Adorno’s
linguistic-conceptual stance, this ‘opening up’ could take diﬀerent forms. It might
provide revelations of hitherto suppressed objective truths that Mahler’s ‘expressive
intentions’ and ‘forcible spirituality’ are seen always to have embodied. It might oﬀer
playful interpretations that, through ‘contemplation’, his music is allowed to inhabit.
Or it might chart radical disruptions that the unassimilable ‘purely musical residue’,
the ‘incommensurable’ and the unpredictable ‘lightning ﬂashes’ that exceed their
own ‘existence’, are made to yield in the critical process.
The uncertainty of these stances stems from a fundamental contradiction: in
claiming that one can only gain perspective on Mahler by moving closer to him,
‘entering into’ him, and ‘confronting the incommensurable’ – and not by rational
objectivity from an ‘ostensibly ﬁxed standpoint external’ to the music – Adorno
appears to reﬂect the problematizing of the subject–object relationship, as identiﬁed
by Luka´cs, in the direction of their postmodern merging or categorial dissolution; or
at least he oﬀers a recognition of the twentieth-century collapse of this relationship
and the need to deal with the situation. But, in contrast to the postmodern mantra
of the object’s surrender before the ever-closer all-powerful gaze of the subject,
Adorno’s ‘A’ group of terms and expressions, listed above, reveals the counter-
balancing fact that ‘[f]or Adorno, truth lies in the Object; it is not merely a projection
of the thinking Subject’.22 He therefore appears to want to have his objective cake
and eat it. If this is the case, then the diﬃculty of Adorno’s approach can be summed
up in terms of his impossibly syncretic feat of maintaining an epistemological
commensurability and a hermeneutic incommensurability as coexistent functions in
his methodology. Preserving the antithesis of wanting to identify or measure what at
the same time one treats as unidentiﬁable and unmeasurable, through processes that
promise but defer identiﬁcation and measurement, is only feasible for Adorno in his
Mahler study by abjuring musical analysis and by adopting ﬁgurative vocabulary
and language structures. More fundamentally, it is also tenable only by addressing
Mahler’s works in their unitary nature as objects whose constituent, ‘purely
musical’, materials oﬀer examples of the historical sedimentation of prior practices.
Richly cultural though Adorno’s readings are, they emerge from a supposed
prioritizing of (originative) production over subsequent processes of distribution
or reception, which are regarded as contingent because they ‘endanger objective
cognition’ and because ‘the eﬀects of works of art y cannot be satisfactorily
determined by recourse to the recipients’.23 Here we may have reached the limits
21 The author is currently involved in a large-scale linguistic, philosophical, aesthetic
and cultural reassessment of Adorno’s Mahler text, the fruits of which will be presented
elsewhere.
22 Paddison, Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture, 61.
23 ‘Theses on the Sociology of Art’, trans. Brian Trench, Birmingham Working Papers in
Cultural Studies 2 (1972): 121, quoted in Paddison, Adorno, Modernism and Mass Culture, 62.
261Barham: Programming Mahler
of Adorno’s ingenious modernist artiﬁce, for in one seminal case coinciding with
the year in which his study appeared in an important third printing (1971), as well
as generally in the years following its ﬁrst publication (1960), and especially from
around the time of Adorno’s death (1969), Mahler’s music began to enjoy a
vigorous ‘counterlife’24 of consumption and reception outside the conventional
environments of the concert hall, the audio recording or the pedagogy of silent
score study, where it has been subject to considerable re-contextualization and
re-description as object, in ways which Adorno (and perhaps Mahler too) would
probably have found deeply problematic. I am referring here to the world of the
moving image. What kind of critical apparatus could eﬀectively address the
multifarious screen appropriations of Mahler?
Elsewhere I have documented 136 cases of the use of Mahler’s music on screen
dating from 1963 to 2008.25 In diﬀerent ways, this ‘counterlife’ dismantles much
of the critical approach set out in the excerpt from Adorno’s book I have been
discussing for the following reasons:
> whether or not Mahler is ‘resistant to theorizing’ and ‘fails to acknowledge the
choice between technique and imaginative content’ becomes somewhat
irrelevant in the face of the third-party requisitioning at work in screen media;
> the ‘expressive intentions’ have been reassigned to, if not re-fashioned for,
whatever context or purpose the requisitioners wish;
> the need for and opportunity to ‘move still closer to him’ is more often than
not prevented, even obviated, by the multi-media aesthetic;
> the transcending of ‘categories of program and absolute music’ is usually
negated by the determined qualities of contingency with which most screen
music is ascribed in order to communicate eﬀectively and economically, to
‘illustrate ideas’ envisaged by the creators;
> taking the notion of a ‘script prescribing its own interpretation’ to extremes
of commensurability, Mahler’s music either has its assumed, rigidiﬁed
meaning (often deriving from the cumulative eﬀects of previous screen use,
and the early model of Death in Venice) applied like quick-drying cement to a
scene – such applications being prescribed for it by the narrative context of
the screen work – or, more interestingly, the screen context alters or adds
new layers to received interpretations of the music;
> resolutely adopting a ‘ﬁxed standpoint’, much screen repertoire operates a
protocol that does indeed ‘tirelessly toy with cliche´s’, especially that of the
‘titanic late Romantic’.
24 I adopt this term from the title of the novel by Philip Roth, an extract from which
heads this article. In the novel, a writer ﬁctionalizes accounts of his family members’ lives
and in eﬀect re-describes for them an alternative existence, in some cases more damaging,
in others more enriching, than ‘real’ life. However, because of the manner of the novel’s
presentation, it is not always entirely clear which aspects of the narrated stories are to be
taken as representative of historical ‘reality’ and which are to be taken as fabrications.
Indeed the unproblematic acceptance of alternative ‘realities’ on the reader’s part seems to
be an essential ingredient of the novel’s aesthetic.
25 Jeremy Barham, ‘Plundering Cultural Archives and Transcending Diegetics:
Mahler’s Music as ‘‘Overscore’’ ’, Music and the Moving Image 3/1 (Spring 2010): 22–47,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/musimoviimag.3.1.0022. Recent additions to the list
are Martin Scorsese’s Shutter Island (2010), which uses the Piano Quartet movement in A
minor, and Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life (2011) which uses the ﬁrst movement of the
First Symphony.
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All of this amounts to a multi-media ‘mis-/re-pronouncement’, ‘(re-)translation’,
or ‘re-description’ of Mahler’s music, a re-characterization rooted to a much
greater extent in the pliable forces of reception than in the means of production.
In attempting to make fuller theoretical sense of these operations, I call on the
pragmatist ideas of philosopher Richard Rorty, an advocate of one of the
strongest modes of anti-foundationalist thinking – a mode that even Lawrence
Kramer criticizes for ‘subordinat[ing] the claims of reason to an extreme skeptical
relativism’.26 In their shared resistance, Kramer, Ju¨rgen Habermas, and more
recently Giles Hooper – all explicit or implicit opponents of Rorty – have been
exercised by the consequences of the latter’s apparent anti-realism. Kramer
continues: ‘Without some appeal to standards of truth and falsehood, reality and
illusion, reason and unreason, neither social institutions nor consensus beliefs
can competently be criticized’.27 Habermas writes:
Reaching understanding cannot function unless the participants refer to a single
objective world, thereby stabilizing the intersubjectively shared public space with
which everything that is merely subjective can be contrasted y Without this
supposition, everyday practices, which rest on the (in a certain sense) Platonic
distinction between believing and knowing unreservedly, would come apart at the
seamsy Rorty’s naturalist strategy leads to a categorial leveling of distinctions of
such a kind that our descriptions lose their sensitivity for diﬀerences that do make
a diﬀerence in everyday practices.28
The Habermasian Hooper concurs:
[T]hat strong epistemological conviction which asserts that objects exist only by
virtue of the particular discursive schema in which they receive their conceptual
articulation ignores the dialectical point that such schemata themselves depend
upon (the quite necessary presumption of) intersubjective agreement about a
‘third-person’ world which exists prior to and independently of them.29
However, Rorty has in fact never repudiated the existence of such a world. In
moving to reject the Platonic, Cartesian and Kantian subject–object models and
systems of representation, he acknowledges its presence but denies its capacity to
determine responses or interpretations:
The causal independence ofy the text from the inquiringy critic does not mean
that she either can or should perform the impossible feat of stripping her chosen
object bare of human concerns, seeing it as it is in itself, and then seeing how our
beliefs measure up to ity The pragmatists replace this idealist formulation with a
wholehearted acceptance of the brute, inhuman, causal stubbornness ofy the text.
But they think this should not be confused with, so to speak, an intentional
stubbornness, an insistence on being described in a certain way, its own way. The
object can, given a prior agreement on a language game, cause us to hold beliefs,
but it cannot suggest beliefs for us to hold.30
26 Lawrence Kramer, Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1995): 7.
27 Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge, 7.
28 On the Pragmatics of Communication (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1998): 359, 377.
29 ‘An Incomplete Project: Modernism, Formalism and the ‘‘Music Itself’’ ’, Music
Analysis 23 (2004): 311–29; quotation, 320.
30 Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 83.
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In his larger shift from a truth-seeking epistemology of commensurability to the
conversational hermeneutics of the incommensurable, Rorty, unlike Adorno who
appears to adhere to the mastery of the object (though perhaps as a cloak for the
opposite), seeks to ‘free us from the hold of an objective, mind-independent,
Platonic world’,31 to dismantle the age-old distinction between knowledge and
opinion, and to follow thinkers (including Nietzsche) who ‘avoid anything that
smacks of philosophy as contemplation, as the attempt to see life steadily and see
it whole, in order to insist on the sheer contingency of individual existence’.32
Instead of inquiry or philosophy, and the beliefs thereby formulated, being
construed as ‘accurate or inaccurate representations of reality, or as candidates
for unconditional validity’, we should, according to Rorty, abandon representa-
tion as a viable concept and take inquiry as the ‘quest for a coherent set of
beliefs’,33 and our beliefs to be ‘action-tools for getting what we want’.34 In such a
view, hermeneutics becomes an attempt to ‘mediate between apparently
incommensurable discourses and vocabularies’,35 a matter of ‘reweaving our
fabric of belief and desire, our attitudes towards various sentences of our
language’.36 The critical urge here to re-describe, as opposed to the metaphysical
drive to demonstrate, is for Rorty encouraged by the reading of novels, such that
he prefers to envisage a progressive contemporary culture as ‘an increasingly
poeticized one’.37 Indeed the root of intellectual progress for him is an
imaginative, rather than inferential, ‘inquiry as recontextualization’,38 whereby
‘ ‘‘creative misuses of language’’ ’,39 ‘new, metaphorical use of old wordsy the
invention of neologisms y and the colligation of hitherto unrelated texts’40
provide opportunities for the re-evaluation of moral, political, aesthetic and
cultural beliefs. It is here, then, that we can begin to locate an apposite
framework for addressing the transplanting of Mahler’s music into ostensibly
alien screen contexts.
In light of my earlier critique of Adorno’s text, and of Rorty’s rejection of
a priori transcendentals or absolutes on the grounds that ‘[t]there is no way to
31 Patricia Herzog, ‘The Practical Wisdom of Beethoven’s ‘‘Diabelli’’ Variations’, The
Musical Quarterly, 79 (1995), 35–54; quotation, 44.
32 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989): 26.
33 Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 101.
34 ‘Truth and Freedom: A Reply to Thomas McCarthy’, Critical Inquiry 16 (1990),
633–43; quotation, 641.
35 R.J. Snell, Through a Glass Darkly: Bernard Lonergan and Richard Rorty on Knowing
without a God’s-Eye View (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2006): 63.
36 Rorty, ‘From Logic to Language to Play: a Plenary Address to the InterAmerican
Congress’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 59 (1986),
747–53; quotation, 750.
37 Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 110.
38 From the title of a chapter in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 93–110.
39 Frans Ruiter, ‘Richard Rorty’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. Hans Bertens
and Jospeh Natoli (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002): 279–286; quotation, 282.
40 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 94. While the term ‘colligation’ has speciﬁc
applications in the ﬁeld of linguistics, describing connections between lexical and
grammatical items of language, and in logic, describing the subsumption of isolated facts
under a single hypothesis or explanation, Rorty here seems to be using it in the general
sense of an act of lumping together objects (to ‘colligate’ literally means to ‘bind together’)
such that each is experienced or ‘read’ in the context of the other.
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reach outside our language-game to an account of the relation between that
language-game as scheme to ‘‘the world’’ as ‘‘content’’ ’,41 I would like to ally this
Rortyan (anti-)philosophical mode with consideration of the act of translation
as re-contextualizing process. Theoretical approaches, going back at least to
Friedrich Schleiermacher’s ‘On the Diﬀerent Methods of Translating’ (1813), have
identiﬁed broadly opposing types of ‘alienating’ and ‘integrating’ translations,42
more recently termed ‘overt’ and ‘covert’.43 As Juliane House suggests:
‘Translation involves the movement of text across time and space, and whenever
texts move, they also shift frames and discourse worlds’, such that the text is re-
contextualized ‘within a new set of relationships and culturally conditioned
expectations’.44 ‘Overt’ translation aims to retain and communicate as much as
possible of the original context in the new context: ‘the [‘overt’] translator puts
target culture members in a position to observe and/or judge this text ‘‘from
outside’’ ’;45 ‘covert’ translation conceals as much of the original context as
possible so as to produce more of a ‘second original’ that ﬁts seamlessly into the
new context: ‘It is the [‘covert’] translator’s express task to ‘‘betray’’ the original
and as it were hide behind its transformation’.46 Thus, though more ‘faithful’ to
the original content, ‘overt’ translations remain deliberately ‘alienated’ from the
target audience, while, in the attempt to retain a correspondence of function,
‘covert’ translations attempt to ‘integrate’ with the target audience through the
application of cultural ﬁlters, and thus involve greater distancing from the
original content.
The usage of Mahler’s music on screen comprises in most cases a Rortyan
‘colligation of hitherto unrelated texts’, and a re-contextualization both of music
and screen text that, in turn, often invites hermeneutic re-description in the
attempt to ‘mediate between apparently incommensurable discourses and
vocabularies’. It is a practice that largely operates in the terms of ‘overt’ or
‘covert’ translation just outlined, and at times results in the substantial
‘reweaving’ of our ‘fabric of belief’ in relation to the ﬁelds of music and the
moving image, or the speciﬁc Mahler and screen works, in ways that go beyond
the merely playful or conformist. The ﬁrst incommensurability to be dealt with is
the inevitable and ubiquitous excerpting of Mahler’s works that takes place in
screen contexts. This commodifying of either the synecdochal part that stands for
the whole or simply the isolated musical moment acts against conventional
notions of the identity and integrity of the work, in favour of a snapshot aesthetic
aligned with the demands of mass entertainment as industry. The diﬀering
implications of the fragmenting of substantial, multi-movement musical
canvasses, the fragmenting of passages of extended continuity within these,
and the fragmenting of what may already be fragmented in nature, are
signiﬁcant. In some cases the extract’s absent surrounding musical context is
replaced by the ﬁlm’s narrative context so that the music functions like any other
41 ‘From Logic to Language’, 751.
42 See Schleiermacher, ‘On the Diﬀerent Methods of Translating’, in Translating
Literature: The German Tradition From Luther to Rosenzweig, ed. Andre´ Lefevere (Assen and
Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977): 67–89.
43 Juliane House, ‘Text and Context in Translation’, Journal of Pragmatics 38 (2006),
338–358; esp. 347.
44 ‘Text and Context in Translation’, 347, 356.
45 ‘Text and Context in Translation’, 348.
46 ‘Text and Context in Translation’, 348.
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scoring cue, revealing in unexpected ways how pre-composed repertoire can
quite easily be made to sound as if it had always been destined to serve as
underscore. And yet at times this process also reﬂects diﬀerent sets of beliefs
back on to the excerpted music and its placing within its original context. An
example of this is Moshe Mizrahi’s War and Love (1985), set amidst the suﬀering
of the Jewish ghettos in second-world-war Poland, which uses Mahler’s First
Symphony as its (historically emblematic) score. The gushingly emotional post-
war reunion of the two young lovers towards the end of this ﬁlm employs bars
464–515 of the ﬁnal movement: the last appearance of the lyrically intense,
appoggiatura-laden second theme in F major. Momentarily, Mahler’s music
assumes the mantle of perfectly synchronized underscore, as initial musical
uncertainty matches physical distance and lack of recognition between the
characters; at the point of the boy’s sigh and recognition of his lost love from afar,
the yearning oboe of bar 480 begins; at ‘Etwas dra¨ngend’ (bar 483) the boy starts
to run as the strings take over with their series of urgent appoggiaturas; by the
textural and melodic highpoint of bar 490, mutual recognition between boy and
girl is achieved; at the piu` mosso and ﬀf of bar 496 as the strings begin their ﬁnal
descent, she starts to run; and at the poco accel. of bar 499 they embrace amid
incoherent sobs. This is more than a case of a piece of pre-existent music ﬁtting a
scene like a glove (the action may well have been choreographed to align with
the musical moments). It serves to illuminate all the more the reading of this
passage as emotional core of reconciliation in the movement: at its previous
appearance, the thematic material was heard in D ﬂat, a key far too distant to
enact resolution. The F major of the passage used here recalls the gentle,
nostalgic, pastorale trio of the Symphony’s second movement (from bar 175) in
the same key, and at the same time provides a more eﬀective means of leading to
the ﬁnale’s subsequent closural triumph in D. Even without the surrounding
musical contexts, this subtly inﬂects our understanding of the ﬁlm’s own
imminent positive ending, also achieved after momentous struggle and pain.
At other times the fractured presentation of musical moments each ‘fulﬁlling
its musical function’ but ‘becoming more than its mere existence’ seems to mirror
the way in which Mahler’s large-scale works are remembered: for their scattered
points of melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, textural or timbral excess, transgression,
negation or withdrawal. In Gregory Nava’s El Norte (1983), after a torturous
struggle through dank sewage pipes, two young Mayan peasant workers ﬁnally
reach their goal of crossing the Mexican border undetected into America in the
hope of starting a new life. Laid out before them is the ‘glorious’ spectacle of San
Diego at night. Their guide tells them they will be in Los Angeles by the next day,
whereupon the startling E major anticipatory breakthrough passage in the third
movement of the Fourth Symphony (from bar 315) explodes into the diegesis,
while a high-altitude panning shot surveys the cityscape as a concrete and steel
utopia. One of the most shockingly unbidden moments in any Mahler work,
which in retrospect we learn is a premonition of the Finale’s heavenly utopia of
pastoral innocence (and in his personal life, Mahler is known to have disliked
urban environments47) collides here with an imaginary narrative prolepsis as
the characters presumably contemplate their future opportunities to escape a life
47 See Herta Blaukopf, ed., Gustav Mahler Briefe, second edition (Vienna: Zsolnay,
1996): 158, and Norman Lebrecht, ed., Mahler Remembered (London: Faber & Faber, 1987):
295, for such accounts relating to Mahler’s experience of Berlin and New York.
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of servitude. Where one suggests the ﬁnal locating of a spiritual Heimat, the other
charts the pioneering move from pastoral oppression into the promise of the
urban unknown. The ﬁlm’s enactment of re-birth recasts, and to some extent
reverses, the Symphony’s progression towards an unbearable lightness of being,
part of Mahler’s philosophical and spiritual quest in which, as for Ernst Bloch
‘the true Genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end y Once the [creative
human] has grasped himself and that which is his y so there will arise in the
world something that shines into everyone’s childhood, but where no one has yet
been: Heimat’.48
In other instances, a screen practice that revels in shorthand associations only
incites all the more strongly a longing for the whole source. As with certain
‘overt’ literary translations, the perpetrators of this form of re-contextualization
might be said, as Goethe remarked, to ‘advertise a half-veiled beauty as being
very lovely: they arouse an irresistible desire for the original’:49
This is particularly the case when ﬁlmmakers, whether interested in the
poietic conditions of Mahler’s music or not, engage in powerful acts of aesthetic
counterpoint between music and image: an alienating eﬀect akin to that of ‘overt’
literary translation. Parts of the ‘Blicket auf!’ aria from the Eighth Symphony’s
second movement setting of the conclusion of Faust Part II (Figs. 176–186) – a
passage of seemingly unassailable sublimity – run like a silver thread through
the work of the New German Cinema’s most radical representative, Rainer
Werner Fassbinder. Obsessed by what he declares to be the music that means
most to him, he usually employs the excerpt at the most depraved, grotesque and
pitiable points of his narratives: for example, Franz Biberkopf is scourged,
sexually humiliated, tortured and defeated in various scenes of utter degradation
in Berlin Alexanderplatz (1980) to this same music. Such moments seem to urge us
to seek all the more avidly for an integration and wholeness of socio-political
identity and cultural expression (all the more pressing given the subject matter
of this screen series, and the chequered Austro-German reception history
of Mahler’s music), and to ﬁnd completion precisely because of the fatalistic
hopelessness and personal and historical fragmentation we are confronted
with: ‘The more fatalistic the ﬁlm is, the more hopeful it is’, as the director
remarked.50
Whenever Mahler’s music is used on screen, the possibilities exist that a) its
historical and cultural baggage are central to that use; b) its historical and
cultural baggage are, at least according to the intentions of the ﬁlmmakers,
irrelevant to that use; and c) its historical and cultural baggage includes its screen
appropriation: in other words its presence is acting as homage to, or parody of, a
tradition established by its earlier screen use. Within these possibilities lie many
ambiguities and incommensurables from which is woven a potentially highly
complex interpretative fabric, not least because the agency of pre-existent music
in screen works cannot be divorced from the variables of listener competency,
48 Das Prinzip Hoﬀnung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1959): 1628, cited and trans. in Bloch,
Atheism in Christianity (London: Verso, 2009): xix.
49 Maximen und Reﬂexionen (1826), cited in Lefevere, Translating Literature, 39.
50 Norbert Sparrow, ‘I let the Audience Feel and Think: An Interview with Rainer
Werner Fassbinder’, Cine´aste 8/2 (1977), 20. For fuller discussion of Fassbinder’s use of this
music see Jeremy Barham, ‘ ‘‘A Time of Gifts’’: Mahler’s Eighth, Fassbinder’s Cinema, and
Musical Politics’ in Mahler’s Eighth Symphony: Studien zur Wertungsforschung, ed. Peter
Revers (Vienna and London: Universal Edition, forthcoming, 2011).
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experience and perceptual/emotional response. At play in many instances are
factors of, for example:
> Mahler’s presumed authorial, personal and historical identity
> The wider socio-political contexts with which he, his music and its reception
have been associated, including the modish character of his 1960s renaissance
and subsequent ‘boom’ years
> The ‘grand narrative’ supplied by the long shadow of Visconti’s Death in
Venice, itself complicated by Mann’s temporarily hidden connection between
Aschenbach and Mahler, by Dirk Bogarde’s physical similarity to Mahler, by
distasteful connotations of paedophilia, by demotic re-readings of the ﬁlm’s
worship of beauty as emblems of warped sexuality, homosexuality or male
eﬀeminacy/eﬀeteness, by a manner of ﬁlm-making using extremely long
takes that fetishize the male ‘gaze’ and attenuate narrative momentum, and
by a general ponderousness that opens itself up for parody
> The widespread imitation of elements of Mahler’s musical idiom by
generations of specialist screen composers including Max Steiner, Erich
Korngold, Hugo Riesenfeld, Bernard Herrmann and John Williams (from
melodic gestures and thematic variant technique, through instrumental eﬀects,
to a provisionalized, moment-to-moment approach to structural change)
> The possibility that the re-contextualizing act of translating Mahler’s music
into a screen environment calls for some kind of subtle or even radical
Rortyan re-description of the music’s received meanings
I would like to conclude by focusing on examples that illustrate the third and
ﬁfth of these factors. The 1994 ﬁlm Venus in Furs (an adaptation of the 1870
Sacher-Masoch novella, directed by Maartje Seyferth and Victor Nieuwenhuijs)
employs the Adagietto from the Fifth Symphony during an erotic sado-
masochistic encounter between the male and female characters in the story
within the story. The music sounds only when there is either the intimation, or
the actual instigation, of ‘normal’ sexual behaviour: while the woman’s abortive
whipping of the man takes place without music, her expressions of emotional
resistance to the practice, her unwillingness to continue, and the man’s subsequent
exquisitely slow coverage of the entire length of her naked body with delicate
kisses ﬁlmed in extreme close-up, all occur as we hear approximately the ﬁrst
four minutes of the movement. The shift to this scene from the ‘real’ world of the
main characters (played by the same actors) had also been accompanied by the
onset of the music, and by a voice-over indicating the male character’s growing
obsession with the woman – a case not of love but of ‘physical enslavement’, as it
is described.
In 1971, Visconti’s Death in Venice greatly enhanced a process of re-description
of the Adagietto from Mahler’s Fifth Symphony that had begun during the post-
war years in the concert hall, recording and other contexts.51 In repeatedly
allying the piece so vividly with narrative contexts of artistic and physical decay,
and ultimately with a prolonged scene in which death and a – perhaps
misguided, perhaps sexually perverted – pathetic longing for unattainable ‘beauty’
are mingled, Visconti’s ﬁlm helped cement both a fashionable performance tradition
51 Among the slowest performances of the Adagietto (at c.15 minutes) is Hermann
Scherchen’s with the Orchestre National de l’ORTF (available on Harmonia Mundi),
recorded in 1965 and thus pre-dating Visconti’s ﬁlm.
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depending on extreme slowness, and a set of assumptions about the ‘intrinsic’
meaning of the music. The mournful, death-related assumptions had previously
been substantially underpinned by Leonard Bernstein’s approach to Mahler, and
more speciﬁcally by his conducting of the Adagietto at the funeral of Robert
Kennedy in New York, in 1968.52 Venus in Furs both draws on and subverts
these traditions. In the former case, it adopts the music’s inherited association with
sexual desire in general, and with a putatively ‘unhealthy’ aspect of sexual activity
in particular. It allies the music with the larger movement of Austro-German
late-nineteenth-century cultural decadence and eroticism in which Leopold von
Sacher-Masoch (whose novella was based on his own experiences acting as a ‘slave’
to his mistress while on a train journey to Venice) was a prominent ﬁgure, but
which was largely anathema to Mahler. In the latter case, the speciﬁcity of the use of
the Adagietto in the scene described above distances the music from connections
with perceived sexual perversion; indeed, on the contrary, it serves to infuse
‘normal’ sexual behaviour with elevated, high-art qualities. In scholarly and
historical terms, Mahler’s music has rarely, if ever, been interpreted in erotic
contexts. Blending with biographical accounts of the composer’s profoundly
serious, ascetic dedication to art and to elemental questions of human existence,
and of Alma Schindler’s declaration that Mahler ﬁlled her with ‘the holiest feelings’
as opposed to the carnal passion of her previous lover Zemlinsky,53 readings of his
music, often in resistance to the ‘intentional fallacy’, have generally eschewed
gendered, eroticized perspectives.54 Though the consultation with Freud in 1910
came about as a result of deteriorating relations with Alma, of which some form
of supposed male sexual dysfunction was a part, Mahler was dismissive of
psychoanalysis’s attribution of sexual causes for all such problems.55 Nevertheless,
it has also been suggested that, years before this, Mahler composed the Adagietto at
least partly in response to his burgeoning emotional and physical attachment to
Alma in the early months of their relationship.56 At the very least, Venus in Furs,
aﬀected exercise in gloriﬁed soft porn though it may be, brings together sex,
gendered discourse and Mahler – ﬁelds of inquiry that remain academically
incommensurate whilst having something of a history in popular culture – into
novel conﬁgurations. Unlike other ﬁlms, which have simply aped or satirized the
Visconti legacy (Permanent Record (1988), Death in Brunswick (1990), Scorchers (1991),
Lorenzo’s Oil (1992), Stiﬀ Upper Lips (1999), Before Night Falls (2000), Paragraph 175
(2000), and Timecode (2000)), this ﬁlm partially resists the ‘covert’ translation process
by which others have presumed a universally culturally understood, transferable
52 Bernstein also conducted Mahler’s Second Symphony in the ‘John F. Kennedy
Memorial concert’ televised two days after the assassination in 1963.
53 See Alma Mahler-Werfel. Diaries 1898–1902, trans. and ed. Antony Beaumont
(London: Faber & Faber, 1998): 464.
54 A rare exception is Peter Franklin’s ‘A Soldier’s Sweetheart’s Mother’s Tale?
Mahler’s Gendered Musical Discourse’ in Mahler and His World, ed. Karen Painter
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002): 111–25. The most extensive psycho-
analytically orientated study of Mahler, Stuart Feder’s Gustav Mahler: A Life in Crisis
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), tends to set Mahler as chaste, deeply spiritual
suﬀerer against Alma as frivolous and destructive pleasure-seeker.
55 See Henry-Louis de La Grange, Gustav Mahler, vol. 4, A New Life Cut Short
(1907–1911) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 884.
56 See Gilbert Kaplan, ‘Adagietto: ‘‘From Mahler with Love’’ ’, in Perspectives on
Gustav Mahler, 379–400. Alma gives candid accounts of her early sexual activity with
Mahler in her diaries; see Diaries 1898–1902, 466–67.
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meaning adopted from prior traditions of semantic solidiﬁcation of a seamless
‘second original’, in favour of the alienating possibilities of ‘overt’ translation in
which the accepted norms of an inherited and shared cultural tradition are
questioned, and more fundamental re-description of an original is invited.
Elsewhere I have discussed the use of the ﬁrst movement of the Third
Symphony in Peter Watkins’s The Gladiators (1969), a ﬁlm that addresses the
futility of war and the oppression of individualism by militaristic states, in the
context of futuristic, staged war games.57 By juxtaposing the movement’s march
sections (bars 799–857, 799–845 (omitting 808–815), and 225–297, 315–363) –
which in the structural context of the music oﬀer two extended attempts at
collectivity and progress, a marshalling of forces towards a shared goal – with
either military preening and pomposity, bitterly cynical accounts of the human
cost of war, or scenes of violence perpetrated by gas-masked, baton-wielding
oﬃcers against two individual escapees (presented in a series of monochrome
stills, with cut-aways to a smug photo shoot of oﬃcious generals), the ﬁlm
encourages a radical re-description of Mahler’s movement. Viewing the beatings
are a selection of military leaders from across the world who defend their actions:
(Italy) ‘Sometimes we must do things like this, people not like, otherwise we look
afraid’
(East Germany) ‘The aggressive tone of West-German imperialists forces the
German Democratic Republic to be strong, to defend the achievements of
socialism. Only socialism is a guarantee of world freedom’
(France) ‘Yes, it is certainly very true’
(India) ‘India cannot isolate herself. She has to live in the community of nations.
Under the impact of these inevitable circumstances, therefore, outside of our
control, we sometimes have to twist matters in conﬂict with our conscience’
(Nigeria) ‘Leniency always has its place, gentlemen, but as a young nation, Nigeria
has to recognize the need for strength and discipline’
Multi-national, top-down collectivity is thus implicitly pilloried, in the ﬁlm, for
its suppression of the individual; and this sentiment very brazenly reﬂects back
on the Mahler march underscoring events here. This march can no longer be
taken at face value as a relentlessly positive, forward-moving, rallying cry of the
masses. It has been cynically undercut, in the manner of the militaristic satire that
pervades, for example, the feature ﬁlm M*A * S *H (which was contempora-
neous with The Gladiators) and its later spin-oﬀ television series, except that this
scene in Watkins’s ﬁlm lacks the humorous edge. If such internationally
sponsored control is held to be incapable of providing an adequate solution to
the kind of problems of expansionist individual nation-states that had triggered
two world wars, then it is perhaps not surprising that in another political era
Mahler’s experience of socio-cultural and geographical nomadism, within an
increasingly fragile multi-national Habsburg Empire, would ﬁnd expression
in the ultimate catastrophic destruction of an ostensibly stable communal march,
not once but twice in this movement (bars 362–367 and 857–863). The ﬁlmic
re-contextualization brings out hitherto submerged possibilities of musical
re-description, which then prove very hard to repress.
In his essay ‘The Pragmatist’s Progress’, Rorty distances himself from the
structuralist dependence on ‘textual mechanisms’, and from the post-structuralist
57 Barham, ‘Plundering Cultural Archives’.
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deconstructing of ‘metaphysical hierarchies’.58 He has also found no meaningful
use for the notion of post-modernism.59 Instead he describes interpreting texts as
‘reading them in the light of other texts, people, obsessions, bits of information
y and then seeing what happens’.60 Such an apparently undisciplined approach
might seem surprising coming from a philosopher steeped in the analytical
tradition. But presumably Rorty at some point came face to face with his own
incommensurable: the realization that after decades spent studying centuries of
systematic thinkers and epistemological discourses, he was still no nearer to an
adequate conceptual representation of reality. This is why he devoted himself to
replacing a failed epistemological commensurability with an experimental and
imaginative hermeneutic incommensurability that has very close aﬃnities with
the sentiments of the Roth quotation at the head of this essay. Rorty writes:
Unmethodical criticism of the sort which one occasionally wants to call ‘inspired’ is
the result of an encounter with an author, character, plot, stanza, line or archaic
torso which has made a diﬀerence to the critic’s conception of who she is, what she
is good for, what she wants to do with herself: an encounter which has rearranged
her priorities and purposes. Such criticism uses the author or text not as a specimen
reiterating a type but as an occasion for changing a previously told story.61
This study has in its own way oﬀered colligations, not just of Mahler and screen,
but also, as part of its critical frame, of Micznik and Adorno, Jephcott and
Adorno, Mahler and Adorno, Adorno and various philosophical traditions, and
Rorty and Kramer/Habermas/Hooper. The remaining, perhaps larger, colligation
is that of Adorno and Rorty, thinkers whose ostensible incommensurability of
concerns and approach masks the shared virtuosic conceptual balancing acts
through which both of them achieve new provisional critical syntheses, and
through which they indeﬁnitely prolong the desire for re-description (including
mutually driven re-descriptions of their own works) in the imaginative
contingency of inspiration and conditioning mediation of language. Through
Mahler’s own processes of creative inspiration (seeming to be dictated to by
higher powers, or being handed the key to unlocking a symphonic ﬁnale like a
sudden ﬂash of lightning) similar re-descriptions have been invited not only
in the language of the symphony, song, and song-symphony, but also in the
re-translated language and semantics of his music’s wider, refracted cultural
dissemination, permeation and engagement: its proliferating ‘counterlife’.
58 In Umberto Eco, Richard Rorty, Jonathan Culler and Christine Brooke-Rose,
Interpretation and Overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992): 89–108; quotations, 105.
59 In interview, Rorty has said: ‘I’ve always found it a useless term. I wouldn’t know
how to deﬁne it or even how to use ity As far as the philosophical ideas go, the ideas that
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